University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

5-1-2011

Modern airline pilots quandary : standard
operating procedures -- to comply or not to comply
Carrie Giles

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
Recommended Citation
Giles, Carrie, "Modern airline pilots quandary : standard operating procedures -- to comply or not to comply" (2011). Theses and
Dissertations. 358.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/358

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

MODERN AIRLINE PILOTS QUANDARY:
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES – TO COMPLY OR NOT TO COMPLY

by
Carrie N. Giles
Bachelor of Science, University of North Dakota, 1996

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
Master of Science

Grand Forks, North Dakota
May
2011

Copyright 2011 Carrie N. Giles

ii

This thesis, submitted by Carrie N. Giles in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of Science from the University of
North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under
whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

_____________________________________
Chairperson

_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________

This thesis meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the
style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the University of
North Dakota, and is hereby approved.

______________________________________
Dean of the Graduate School

______________________________________
Date
iii

PERMISSION

Title: Modern Airline Pilots Quandary: Standard Operating Procedures –
To Comply or Not to Comply
Department:

Aviation

Degree:

Master of Science

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a
graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the
library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further
agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be
granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or in his absence,
by the chairperson of the department or the dean of the Graduate
School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this
thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my
written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given
to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which
may be made of any material in my thesis.

_________________________________________
Signature

__________________________________________
Date
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………....….. viii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW......................................... 1
Literature Review................................................................ 5
Advanced Qualification Programs.................................. 8
Pilot Personalities............................................................... 11
Learning Theory................................................................ 12
Aeronautical Decision Making....................................... 15
Line Operations Safety Audit.......................................... 18
Flight Operational Quality Assurance............................ 20
ASAP……………………………………………….....…......... 22
PINC and PUNC................................................................ 25
Safety Culture................................................................... 28
Research Questions.......................................................... 32

v

II.

METHODOLOGY........................................................................... 38
The Survey.......................................................................... 39
Corporate strategy to improve SOP compliance........ 40
Participants........................................................................ 41
Protection of Human Subjects........................................ 41
Potential Biases................................................................. 42
Data Analysis..................................................................... 43

III.

RESULTS.......................................................................................... 45
Statistical Analysis............................................................. 47
Data Summary ................................................................. 48

IV.

DISCUSSION.................................................................................. 50
Recommendations........................................................... 64
Future Research................................................................ 70
Conclusion......................................................................... 73

APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 76
Appendix A ............................................................................................ 77
Appendix B ............................................................................................. 80
Appendix C ............................................................................................ 81
Appendix D ............................................................................................ 82
REFERENCES....................................................................................................... 91

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1.

Top 12 non standard items ranking ..................................................... 46

2.

Non-standard results ............................................................................. 45

3.

Before Taxi/Taxi Checklist ...................................................................... 51

4.

After Landing - Taxi Checklist ............................................................... 51

5.

Non-standard Standardized Descent Speed Compliance ............. 52

6.

Non-standard Cruise Checklist ............................................................ 53

7.

Non-standard Climb Speed Policy Compliance ............................... 54

8.

Non-standard Takeoff Briefing ............................................................. 55

9.

Non-standard Appearance ................................................................. 59

10.

Non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for All Altitude Changes .... 60

11.

Non-standard Before Starting Engine Checklist ................................ 61

12.

Non-standard Parking Checklist .......................................................... 62

13.

Non-standard (G)FMS Route/Legs Verification Check ..................... 62

vii

ABSTRACT
Modern airline pilots are tasked every flight with the safe and efficient
operation of highly automated airliners in today’s complicated global
and economic environments. Airlines have developed standard
operating procedures (SOP) for normal, abnormal, and emergency
operations. These procedures serve as a script for crews to follow. These
procedures are designed by airlines to ensure that aircraft are operated in
the (1) most safe, (2) most efficient, and (3) most on-time manner. For the
most part pilots will comply with SOP, but when they (1) don’t agree with
SOP, (2) don’t understand SOP or the risks associated with not complying
with SOP, or (3) don’t feel adequately trained to know what SOP is, it is
difficult to motivate them to comply. Airlines have the means to measure
compliance through Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Line
Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). The purpose of this research is to
determine if increased understanding, knowledge and awareness of the
risk of non compliance with SOP increase airline pilots’ compliance with
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SOP. This research explores data from line checks at a major US airline
that was gathered in pursuit of understanding what drives SOP
compliance. Baseline data was gathered and analyzed to determine the
top 12 non compliant items. The airline provided training during the
Human Factors module in each pilots recurrent training on Pilot Intentional
Non Compliance (PINC). The training including developing pilots’
understanding that while most Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
reports grant pilots immunity from legal action, if a violation is labeled
PINC, ASAP protections do not apply. Further line checks were
conducted after the pilots received the PINC training. The top 12 non
compliant items from the pre-PINC training group were compared to the
same 12 items in the post-PINC training group. Significant improvement in
SOP compliance was found in six of the 12 items tested. The results
established that training pilots on the risk of PINC did significantly increase
SOP compliance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
”Why? Because I said so.” For the general population, these words
provide very little motivation to comply with a request. However, in the
black and white world of aviation, pilots are trained to follow the rules
simply because they are the rules and the rules were made to be
followed, and because the FAA and company policies and procedures
“said so.”
Checklists are completed step by step on every flight. Procedures
for normal, abnormal and emergency operations are carefully developed
and pilots are trained to followed them precisely. In fact, creative
solutions are simply not allowed unless every other option has failed, a
situation that has rarely been encountered in modern airline flying.
In normal day-to-day line operations, SOP allow pilots who have
never worked together before or perhaps even met each other before to
safely operate complex flights. According to Dismukes, Berman and
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Loukopoulos (2007), “These written scripts establish the correct way to
perform procedures and provide standardization across pilots.
Standardization is crucial” (p. 2). Crews of two to four pilots are often
brought together for the first time an hour before departure time and are
expected to work together to provide the most safe, comfortable and
profitable flight possible. Each pilot has a role and a script, and ideally, if
SOP is followed, there should be very few surprises in normal, abnormal or
emergency operations.
The knowledge of pilots’ compulsion to comply with rules and
regulations leaves airlines struggling to understand why Line Operations
Safety Audits (LOSA) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)
show that pilots are not dutifully complying with all Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP). Several recent incidents and accidents point directly
to deviation from SOP as a primary cause.
In the fatal crash in Buffalo, NY of Continental Connection Flight
3701, a Bombardier Q400 that was operated by Colgan Air, the NSTB
found that:
Contributing factors included his [pilot’s] failure to monitor other
warning signals of the plane's slowing speed, and violation of ‘sterile
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cockpit’ rules against casual conversation at low altitudes. The
board also said Colgan had failed to spell out adequate
procedures for crews to monitor air speed when icing is a risk
(Trumbell, 2010, p. 90).
In the fatal crash of a Northwest Airlink ferry flight of a Bombardier CRJ-200
operated by Pinnacle Airlines:
The NTSB determined that the ‘unprofessional behavior, deviation
from standard operating procedures and poor airmanship’ of
Pinnacle Flight 3701's two-man crew led to the crash of the regional
jet (Fiorino, 2007, p. 25).
The wingtip damage of an American Airlines MD-82 on Flight 1402 was a
nonfatal event in Charlotte, NC, where:
A big question facing investigators is whether American's basic
operational rules and procedures were followed. If complications
crop up once an aircraft descends below 1,000 feet on an
instrument approach, pilots generally are trained to break off the
descent, gain altitude and circle back for another landing (Paztor,
2009, p. A6).
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And, the investigation into the nonfatal crash of Continental Airlines Flight
1404, a 737-500 in Denver, CO, that departed the runway midfield during
takeoff found that:
The captain’s use of the nosewheel steering tiller was contrary to
company procedures and neither of these late control inputs was
an effective method for turning the airplane at high speed. The
NTSB concludes that the captain’s use of tiller and full right control
wheel in the 3 seconds before the excursion likely resulted from
acute stress stemming from a sudden, unexpected threat,
perceived lack of control, and extreme time pressure (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2010, p. 44).
These accidents and incidents clearly illustrate the importance of
compliance with SOP.
It is the airline’s responsibility to ensure SOP are safe and their pilots
understand and able to comply with current SOP. Clearly, the pilot’s
choice to deviate from or disregard SOP creates risk for the airline,
passengers and crewmembers. According to Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR) and Airline Operation Specifications (Ops Specs), it is
the pilot’s obligation to comply (FAR/AIM 2011). This paper intends to
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explore the reasons for noncompliance and the effects of specific
initiatives designed by airlines to improve pilots’ compliance with SOP.

Literature Review
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are written, published and
tested procedures that are expected to be universally and consistently
applied within an organization. Further definition explains that SOP should
identify and describe the standard tasks and duties of a flight crew for
each flight phase, including what to do and when to do it. Also, SOP
should be simple, clear, concise and prescriptive (Aviation Glossary, 2010).
From the early days of ab initio training, modern airline pilots are
trained in the use of checklists and other procedures defined as SOP.
From the moment a crew is brought together in the flight planning room
until the cockpit door is locked and post-flight procedures are completed,
a very specific series of steps are taken to dictate interactions between
crew members. Furthermore, abnormal and emergency procedures are
defined with specific protocol to ensure the best possible outcome of an
unexpected circumstance.
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FAR 121.533 is directly quoted in airline operating manuals and
states “the Captain shall operate in accordance with FARs, Ops Specs
[SIC] and airline procedures and policies except under circumstances
provided for in FAR 121.557 [Captain’s emergency authority]” (FAR/AIM
2011). Furthermore, operating manuals assign the Captain with the duty
of ensuring the timely completion and accurate adherence to checklist
procedures (Flight Operations Manual, 2011). When the Ops Specs
provide SOP that are simple, clear, concise and prescriptive it is easy for a
Captain to understand how to comply. However, sometimes SOP are not
easy to understand and apply, and that makes compliance difficult
(Dismukes et al., 2007).
Airlines have long relied on protocol in the form of Standard
Operating Procedures to coordinate and execute safe flights, and many
other high-risk industries have followed the example set by airlines when
developing their own SOP. For example, the medical field defers to
airlines’ extensive experience and success with SOP and often uses airline
SOP as a pattern for their own. According to Pape (2003), “The key to
preventing medication errors lies within adopting protocols from other
safety focused industries. The airline industry, for example, has methods in
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place that improve pilot’s focus and provide a milieu of safety when
human life is at stake” (p. 91).
The overriding rules for airline operations are made by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), but SOP is carefully developed by each
airline to take the airline beyond safety to improve efficiencies and
reduce surprises in the cockpit. Sukenik (1998) found that, “Adhering to
SOP leads to a maximum utility and, thus, to greater flight safety than
deviating from it, even if an alternative procedure is equivalent as far as
safety is concerned or seems to lead to greater utility” (p. 405). The
airlines want their pilots to follow SOP because it has been proven to
increase safety and save money. Furthermore, FAR 121.533 states that
pilots are obligated by their certificates to follow the FARs, put safety first,
and to follow their respective operation specifications, also known as SOP
(FAR/AIM, 2011).
Beyond the regulations, studies show that SOP should be adhered
to in a pilot’s pursuit of individual safety. Baker (2007) analyzed the effects
of SOP compliance and found that, “Within an airline, management,
operations, maintenance, training, equipment, and pilots must all be
aligned. Accidents occur when breakdowns arise in the interactions of
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these components” (p. 186). Simply put, strict adherence to SOP helps
each individual involved with the operation of a flight know what to
expect. Baker’s research showed clearly that, while SOP are not perfect,
compliance with SOP make airlines safer, and noncompliance can lead
to aircraft incidents and accidents. Furthermore, in analysis of 19 U.S.
Airline accidents in the period of 1990-2000, Dismukes, et al. (2007) found
inadequate execution of highly practiced normal procedures under
challenging conditions and deviation from explicit guidance or SOP as
two of six common themes underlying the NTSB’s label “pilot error” as an
accident cause or contributing factor. The authors felt noncompliance
due to a lack of understanding or execution of SOP or blatant disregard
for SOP are key problems that airlines must acknowledge and address in
any attempts to increase SOP compliance.

Advanced Qualification Programs
In 1994 United Airlines Training Center developed the first Advanced
Qualification Program (AQP) for the Boeing 737-300. United began
operating the Boeing 777 in 1995 and all training on that aircraft has been
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accomplished under AQP (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991). This
alternate method of training allows for more cost-effective training with
the goal of increasing operator proficiency (Taylor & Emanuel, 2000).
Today in 2011 nearly all major U.S. airlines, along with growing number of
U.S. regional airlines, participate in this voluntary program.
The purpose of AQP is to encourage the use of innovative
technologies, training and evaluation features to improve training
performance. These programs are systematically developed,
continuously maintained, and empirically validated proficiency-based
training systems (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991).
During a pilot’s career, they will experience initial (new-hire),
transition (new airplane type), upgrade (new seat) and recurrent training.
Recurrent training consists of simulator training to proficiency, along with
14 “part 121-mandated-training requirements...Crew Resource
Management (CRM) and human factors” (Hughes, 1995, p. 27). Pilots are
trained on the proper execution of SOP for all phases of flight in normal,
abnormal and emergency operations. Evaluations are designed to
ensure that understanding of SOP is demonstrated before the pilot is
qualified for line operations. Once qualified on an aircraft, a pilot
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experiences training at least once a year under AQP. Additional training
requirements are met through computer-based exams.
Once every 24 months each Captain is required to experience a
line check. The term “line operations” refers normal flights during regularly
scheduled trips, so a line check is an observation of a pilot during line
operations (Klinect, Helmreich, Murray, & Merritt, 2003). During these line
checks a check airman observes the Captain in line operations and
assesses SOP compliance. These line checks are jeopardy events,
meaning the pilot must pass or be removed from line flying for training to
resolve deficient areas. Some of the Microscope Line Checks (MLC)
referred to later in this study were done during routine line checks required
by AQP.
As mentioned above, AQP requires airline pilots to be trained in
crew resource management (CRM). CRM is defined as a set of principles
that pilots and others are taught to use to make effective use of all
available resources – human, equipment and information. Interaction
and coordination among team members are emphasized (Dismukes,
2007). In the event SOP are not being followed or are in question, CRM
training helps to increase each pilot’s ability to communicate the
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discrepancy, regardless of position in the cockpit. First Officers are
responsible to speak up if any other crew member, including the Captain,
is not in compliance with SOP.
Helmreich (2001) discusses the specific skills that CRM training
provides to countermeasures against risks and errors. The author explains
how these skills equip pilots to be more alert and vocal about threats and
impending errors, including the ability to better detect errors and manage
their resolution.

Pilot Personalities
According to Bartram (1995), there are many commonalities in
personality type between the airline pilot applicant and the pilots
operating aircraft being flown by airlines today. Those who become
airline pilots have similar personalities, and little difference exists in the
traits of those trained in the military versus purely civilian trained pilots.
However, it is important to understand that pilots’ interests and methods of
approaching crew coordination vary as personalities range across the
general population (Chidester, 1991).
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Research shows that the pilot population is commonly wired for
success because they must be driven to make it into their highly
competitive business, and that commonality groups them together. As a
group, pilots score significantly more intelligent, emotionally stable, and
mature in comparison to the general population norms (Wakcher, 2003).
For risk assessment, pilots are trained (often times through experience) to
make good decisions in all circumstances, and risk-management is a skill
that improves with experience (Hunter, 2002). Also, as their experience
increases, pilots are less likely to be involved in a violation of any Federal
Aviation Regulations (Rebok, Qiang, Baker, McCarthy & Li, 2005).

Learning Theory
Airline pilots today are trained in a variety of learning environments,
including classroom, simulator, computer based modules and line
operations. Once initial training is completed, recurrent training is
accomplished in all of these environments to refresh already developed
skills and ensure understanding of changes to SOP.
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Since the purpose of this research is to evaluate experienced pilots’
compliance with SOP, it is important to understand how pilots learn
following initial training. Pilots are always building on experience, whether
it is with a new airplane, a new procedure, or a new role. While each new
learning experience presents challenges of different degrees, professional
pilots are expected to perform well in all aspects of training as it is part of
their job. Each new training experience begins with transfer of learning
from a pilot’s previous experience, and in order for the training to be
effective the pilot must overcome, agree with the new procedure and
become proficient at executing it. In line operations, pilots are expected
to adopt and comply with company prescribed SOP. This requires pilots to
overcome any bias, including any personal dislike or disagreement with
SOP (Dismukes et al., 2007).
All procedural changes require the creation or alteration of SOP
and the training for pilots to understand what is now expected of them.
Clearly, the airlines are very experienced and very good at making SOP
for all areas of operation, and as new procedures are implemented, a
checklist normally accompanies them (Sukenik, 1998).
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For example, the beginnings of the FAA’s NextGen implementation
have included the development for Required Navigation Performance
Area Navigation (RNAV-RNP) approach procedures. Each airline seeking
FAA approval to fly RNAV-RNP approaches has developed their SOP for
how the approaches will be loaded into the Flight Management
Computer (FMC), briefed by the pilot flying (PF), flown by the PF, and what
steps will be taken by the pilot monitoring (PM). All pilots are trained on
the specific procedures in initial, transition, upgrade and recurrent training
before they are qualified to fly RNAV-RNP approached in line operations.
In most cases pilots are given a checklist or some other sort of tool to
guide them through the steps to fly an RNAV-RNP approach in the
company specified manner.
The concern arises when the FAA sets the minimums for training
requirements, and the standards are influenced by cost cutting initiatives.
Dismukes et al. (2007) found “inadequate knowledge or experience
provided by training and/or guidance” (p. 298) was a factor in a third of
the 19 accidents studied. A critical component of these accidents
involved pilots who found themselves in “challenging situations for which
they had received training, but the experience they received from that
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training was of inadequate fidelity to the actual situation, inadequately
detailed, or incomplete” (p. 298). In these accidents the authors
discovered the pilots completed the training, but the airlines’ efforts to
ensure that pilots understood SOP to the point they would be comfortable
executing new procedures simply fell short. The authors go on to explain
that if airlines were more aware of the limitations of their training, they
could make modifications and train pilots to make well thought out
decisions that utilize SOP based on their solid understanding of how to
apply the new SOP to real-life situations.

Aeronautical Decision Making
It was long believed pilot’s decision-making was based on analysis
performed by considering a range of solutions, evaluating each option to
determine how each would affect the flight, then choosing the best
option. This decision tree is known as the Rational Choice method (Klein,
2000). Klein explains further that pilots simply don’t have the time to
consider all options in situations where an instant decision must be made.
Because of the time pressure to make a decision, pilots often look for the
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first workable option. The best rules can be rendered useless when
conditions or circumstances never considered become a pilot’s present
reality.
Research shows that when faced with a decision, experienced
pilots will normally make a choice based on the circumstances they
understand, and unless there is a good reason to change course, they will
press on. This is not a stubborn act, but instead it demonstrates a pilot’s
keen ability to assess a situation and decide how to respond. This skill, also
known as situational awareness (SA) is the ability to identify one’s position
in relation to other aircraft in a flight environment. A pilot with good SA will
“comprehend the various forces that are acting on the airplane and will
be able to anticipate how these forces will shape the future course of the
airplane” (Klein, 2000, p. 173). Pilots are not likely to consider many
options and choose the best, as Rational Choice would imply. Instead
pilots use experience to make a decision, and only if there is time for
additional consideration and the wisdom of their current choice becomes
questionable will they seek out other solutions (Klein, 2000).
Airline training departments are tasked with training pilots with a
broad range of experience. Therefore, if experience is a required
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component of good decision-making, the natural and accurate
conclusion is that the most common reason for poor decisions is a lack of
experience (Klein, 2000). Understanding how pilots learn and make
decisions is key to developing training on SOP. SOP is developed not
necessarily to bring pilots to the best choice, based on the pilot’s
experience, but to the prescribed choice. An example is the Quick
Reference Handbook (QRH), which is part of the Aircraft Flight Manual
(AFM) approved by the FAA, and is used to guide pilots through abnormal
and emergency procedures.
For example, abnormal findings often have prescribed procedures
in the QRH. It contains checklists and decision trees that assist a pilot in
understanding what each specific system failure means and what
decisions need to be made. Under SOP, pilots are expected to respond
to an abnormal findings by accomplishing immediate action items
associated with their condition (if any) and then referring to the QRH.
Pilots are expected to accomplish the QRH - exactly as written - unless
there is some reason why the Captain determines it would be safer to act
otherwise. Any decision to act outside the protocol defined by SOP falls
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under the realm of Captain’s emergency authority (Aircraft Operating
Manual, 2010).
The problem occurs when a pilot possesses prior experience is
better understood than the current SOP. This experiential knowledge may
be the basis of the pilot’s first choice and the choice they continue with
unless it becomes unsafe to proceed. If pilots are less familiar with SOP
than they are with a procedure they have tested and know to be safe,
they are unlikely to trust SOP when faced with decision making in
abnormal or emergency situations (Dismukes et al., 2007). This is why it is
so critical for airlines to train their pilots in all SOP, ensuring that they
understand and trust the SOP and they understand that any deviation
from SOP outside of an emergency situation is a violation of their
certificate (Dismukes et al., 2007).

Line Operations Safety Audit
Besides the AQP required line checks, airlines employ a safety tool
known as Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). These cockpit
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observations are similar to line checks as they are gathered during normal
flight operations, but their purpose is different:
In the most general of terms, LOSA is similar to getting your
cholesterol checked during a routine examination. The test, usually
performed as a preventive measure, provides evidence of risk on
having a heart attack or other serious health event. The results
themselves do not provide a solution but can prompt a person to
make healthier lifestyle choices. A person might also choose to do
nothing and carry on as normal. Either way, the person learned
something and is responsible for change. LOSA is the same. It
provides a diagnostic snapshot of safety performance. It uses
cockpit observations collected in normal operations to provide a
profile of safety strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the onus is on
the airline to respond to the data and make change if necessary, in
order to prevent an incident or accident. (Klinect et al., 2003)
Like AQP, these line checks are voluntary.
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Flight Operational Quality Assurance
Flight Operational Quality Assurance, or FOQA, is another voluntary
safety program approved by the FAA for commercial airline use allowing
commercial airlines and pilots to share de-identified information with the
FAA. The FAA can use this information to monitor national trends in aircraft
operations and prescriptively apply resources to address operational risk
issues (Longridge, 2003). Like ASAP, this information is de-identified and
voluntarily disclosed to the FAA by the airlines in cooperation with the
union. This information is electronically generated through a Flight Data
Acquisition Unit, or FDAU, that works along with the Flight Data Recorder
(FDR) to record specific flight parameters. This information is collected
and downloaded through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) that sends the desired parameters as digital
information to the Gatekeeper. The Gatekeeper is typically a union
official who is the only person with the ability to link the collected data to
the specific flight and therefore individual crewmembers (Holtom, 2006).
The information gathered for the FOQA program is analyzed for three
main purposes: exceedence analysis, statistical analysis, and validated
trend information (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004). Exceedence
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data would include any flight parameter outside of the normal operating
envelope for normal operations, for instance a roll angle of greater than
45 degrees. Normal operations would not require more than 30 degrees
of bank, and while 45 degrees of roll is not necessarily a dangerous flight
attitude, it is outside the normal flight parameters. The gatekeeper can
use this FOQA data to determine the exact time, altitude and phase of
flight to understand if this was a momentary exceedence or if this was a
trend. If there is a reported bank of 60 degrees or more, the gatekeeper
might choose to conduct a more detailed investigation of the event
(FAA, 2004).
Statistical data can be used to identify trends at a given airline that
might be useful for improving operations and refining procedures. For
example, an airline might notice through FOQA data that ATC requests to
maintain higher airspeeds on arrival are resulting in a high occurrence of
unstabilized approaches leading to go-arounds. This information might
influence an adjustment to current procedures resulting in better
managed approaches, thereby increasing the number of stabilized
approaches leading to successful landings.
Validated trend information is used to ensure all required
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maintenance action is completed if there is an unreported exceedence.
For example, if an aircraft limitation is exceeded a maintenance
inspection is required. If the exceedence is not entered into the aircraft
logbook for any reason, FOQA exceedence data will trigger an
inspection. The gatekeeper can link the data to the flight and follow up
with the flight crew to understand the circumstances of the event (FAA,
2004).

ASAP
The first ASAP program was started at American Airlines (AA) in 1994.
It was an agreement between the airline, the union, and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). The program was modeled after NASA’s
Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP), a program that allowed pilots
to disclose safety violations without risk of punishment. The NASA program
was good, but the airlines were only able to access a limited amount of
data and unable to gain the specific information necessary to improve
the safety of their operations. The ASAP program was developed for an
18-month trial period with this goal in mind:
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The objectives of the American Airlines Aviation Safety Action
Program are to prevent accidents and incidents. The means
by which we accomplish these objectives are by identifying
flight safety concerns and achieving corrective action.
Consequently, ASAP analyzes risks, increases education and
awareness, validates program effectiveness, measures system
performance and ensures accountability. As a result, a
successful ASAP should help to increase employee
compliance with the FARs. The scope of events that are
considered under ASAP includes any observation that
highlights a potential flight safety concern. The actions taken
in this program reflect the desire of all parties to solve
problems through corrective action and education. ASAP
combines essential self- reporting elements of previous selfreporting programs and provides solutions to the identified
hazards in order to prevent incidents and accidents (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 20)
The program was recognized early in its existence as very forward
thinking. This statement from then CEO Don Carty was made in the
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presence of President Clinton, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and union
officials as they met when American Airlines' ASAP Program was honored
At White House in 2000:
The ASAP program is a model of what can be done when business,
labor and an enlightened government agency work together
positively. Without question, the outstanding leadership of Jane
Garvey at the FAA has allowed this and other safety initiatives to
thrive. (American Airlines Press Release, 2000, p. 1)
After the 18-month trial the program was made permanent at AA.
Since then ASAP programs have been adopted at most U.S. Airlines.
Programs have also been implemented for mechanics, flight attendants
and dispatchers. The program encourages workers to “voluntarily report
any incident that might raise a safety concern or any circumstances
where safety might have been compromised” (American Airlines Press
Release, 2000, p. 1). From these reports the airlines are able to gather
information that otherwise may have not been reported if the risk of
punishment existed.
There are certain events that are reported that are not covered
under ASAP’s umbrella of protection. "In instances involving possible
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criminal activity, substance abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or
intentional falsification the terms of confidentiality contained in this MOU
do not apply” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 14). In the event
an excluded event is reported the Event Review Team (ERT) must turn over
that information to the FAA and law enforcement, as appropriate
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2009). While most reports grant
employees immunity from legal action, there are certain cases where
ASAP protections do not apply:
It's not supposed to be a ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card for outrageous,
unsafe, unprofessional behavior. Instead, it is supposed to allow
good people to report on mistakes they've made without being
punished -- mistakes that otherwise would go unreported and
uncorrected. (Maxon, 2008, p. 1)

PINC and PUNC
James Huntzinger, the former Vice President of Safety, Security &
Compliance at Korean Air has been credited with coining the terms
Procedural Intentional Noncompliance (PINC) and Procedural
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Unintentional Noncompliance (PUNC) (Agur, 2007). Quite simply, these
acronyms are used to label behavior as pilots’ unintentional or intentional
deviation from company prescribed SOP.
The Air Safety Foundation reported that a review of accidents
involving professionally flown aircraft shows that four out of five events
included PINC or PUNC by pilots. Additionally, “PINCs and PUNCs are
reduced dramatically when an effective safety culture exists.” (Agur, 2007,
p. 13). One might conclude that the way to reduce PINCs and PUNCs is
to increase the effectiveness of the safety culture at an airline. Simple as
that sounds, U.S. major airlines are already incredibly safe and have
effective safety cultures in place (Snyder, 2007). Moreover, “on a typical
American airline, your chances of dying on a flight are somewhere
around one in 13 million.” (Maxa, 2009, p. 1)
It has already been established that airline safety records are
commendable and current regulations motivate operators to avoid
situations where they could be violated by the FAA. The question as to
why PINC and PUNC are surfacing as causes of aircraft incidents,
accidents and as a contributing factor on ASAP reports remains.
Huntzinger (2006) summarized the following:
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What's interesting is that PINC events typically involve crews who
have been flying most of their adult lives — veteran aviators who
train on simulators once or twice a year; attend initial and then
recurrent training classes that cover procedures, FARs, limitations
and other best practices; practice CRM; ride with check airmen;
and so on. In short, they clearly know the rules and regulations, yet
they intentionally violate them. (p. 42)
Huntzinger describes the three elements of a PINC event as: (1) a
reward for the violator; (2) knowledge of the associated risk; (3)
consideration of how ones peers will react. If a pilot is able to determine
that, for example, the reward of an on-time arrival (getting to the layover
hotel sooner) is worth the risk of an unstabilized approach (that by SOP
should result in a go-around) and in their opinion they determine that
continuing the approach and landing would be considered safe enough
by their peers, even if it violates SOP, and even though they know better,
their safe enough landing has all the elements required for PINC. “They
[PINC] are often the result of well-meaning pilots trying to do their job but
willfully taking risks to achieve what should be a secondary goal,
‘completing the mission.’” (Agur, 2007, p. 36)
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PUNC can be considered a SOP violation that is less deliberate in
nature, but it is the result of a lack of information or understanding that
results in a pilot unknowingly violating SOP. The pilot is responsible to
comply with company SOP, and the airline is responsible to train the pilots
who operate their aircraft. An effective airline safety culture strives to
inform pilots of ever evolving SOP, but this is not an easy task. Anthony
(2009) summarizes: “Aviation is inherently a dynamic and ever-changing
industry that is constantly producing hazards even as it strives to reduce
them” (p. 42). The task of finishing the work of SOP development so that
pilots can be perfectly informed of SOP is never complete, and PUNC is
often the result of a lack of training by the company and thereby pilot’s
efficiency in understanding of SOP.

Safety Culture
According to Reason (1998), “Safety cultures evolve gradually in
response to local conditions, past event, the character of the leadership
and the mood of the workforce” (p. 293). Research has already
established that it is in a professional pilot’s nature to comply with the
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rules, and that they do not want to be charged with PINC or PUNC
(Rebok, 2008). They are already naturally resistant to risky behavior, yet
these pilots are not perfectly compliant with SOP. If an ideal safety culture
is needed to drive airlines to a sustainable condition of SOP compliance
“regardless of the leadership’s personality or current commercial
concerns” (Reason, 1998, p. 294), what can already safe airlines do to
positively affect their safety cultures and increase compliance?
When looking to the root cause of forces that drive ‘rule followers’
to become ‘rule breakers’, research shows that if there is a lack of
understanding of what unacceptable behavior is, unacceptable
behavior will happen (e.g., PUNC). If there is a lack of understanding of
the consequences of unacceptable behavior, known unacceptable
behavior will happen (e.g., PINC) (Huntzinger, 2006). Education (training)
to the point of applicability to line operations is the key. The idea that the
noncompliant behavior is only a negative when detected is false
because (1), much of it is detected through FOQA and (2),
noncompliance with SOP can lead to incidents and accidents, outcomes
pilots and management are fundamentally against. In describing a just
culture, Reason (1998) states that, “All members of an organization should
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understand where the line must be drawn between unacceptable
behaviour [SIC], deserving of disciplinary action, and the remainder,
where punishment is neither appropriate nor helpful in furthering the
cause of safety” (p. 303). An informed culture is a safe culture, and when
both management and pilots are motivated to avoid risks and stay out of
the newspapers, it seems that information is key.
Following the crash in Buffalo, NY, of Continental Connection Flight
3407, a flight operated by Colgan Air, in February of 2009, the cockpit
voice recorder (CVR) was reported to have “distracted banter” during
the period of sterile cockpit required by FAR 121.542 during all non-cruise
operations below 10,000 feet MSL (Trumbell, 2009). These and other
incidents and accidents have led to increased concern for airlines and
pilots and are grounds for scrutiny by the FAA of pilot-professionalism in
U.S. airline cockpits. In an article written for USA Today, FAA Administrator
Randy Babbitt (2010) comments on the access the FAA has to flight
information:
The FAA has more information from airlines, pilots and aircraft
recorders than we have ever had before. These tools enable our
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safety inspectors to better analyze data, spot safety trends, and
prioritize risks before accidents happen. (p. 10A)
Both airline management and pilot unions have little interest in voluntarily
giving the FAA access to data that could put them in jeopardy, and, while
airline safety programs have been developed with protections from
disciplinary action, all parties involved are skeptical (Logan, 2008). Pilot
unions have raised concerns about AQP and LOSA, which rely on
concepts like “train to proficiency” and the integrity of the process, which
requires management and pilots to trust each other. Any lack of trust
reduces the authenticity of the results. Simply put: “If an airline fails to
earn its pilots’ trust, then LOSA will be nothing more than an elaborate line
check, and the airline will have wasted an opportunity to gain a unique
perspective of actual practices on the line.” (Klinect et al., 2003, p. 5)
CVR data is only analyzed when there is reason to collect it
following an accident or incident, and pilots’ unions do not favor allowing
more access for the FAA or even airline officials (Wald, 2005), but there is
plenty of other data available for scrutiny.
Programs like ASAP, FOQA, LOSA audits and the FAA’s involvement
with airline training allow for regulators to understand much of what is

31

happening in U.S. airline cockpits. In an article describing airlines efforts to
prevent errors, Logan (2008) made this conclusion: “Airline safety
programs have evolved from reactive to proactive programs in an
attempt to improve an already excellent safety record. Zero accidents
are the goal that the industry strives for” (p. s181). These tools are used by
the FAA and airlines to discover trends and areas where a lack of SOP
compliance is indicated.

Research Questions
The purpose of this research is to determine if increased
understanding, knowledge and awareness of the risk of noncompliance
with SOP will increase airline pilots’ compliance with SOP. It has already
been established that pilots are commonly a very capable group. As
their experience grows, their adversity to high-risk may cause them to
avoid situations where they might find trouble. Often times their
intelligence drives them to make the wisest, most prudent choice as they
strive for safety. A natural extension to understanding pilot personalities
might be to assume that they are likely to enjoy the establishment of SOP
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and are excited to follow it to the letter. Quite the contrary, pilots are not
content with the way labor has been treated in “the airline
industry’s...most volatile period in the past 20 years” (Goodman, 2008, p.
14). This frustration could serve as a distraction resulting in attention to
SOP being diverted (Dismukes et al., 2007).
Since September 11, 2001, uncertainty has ruled airline aviation,
and when it comes to pushing for compliance, pilots have a tendency to
push back. A quandary is defined as a state of doubt or uncertainty,
especially with regard to the choice of alternatives (Quinion, 2008). In the
case of PINC, the pilots’ know SOP but choose another procedure, where
in the case of PUNC the SOP may not be clear or properly understood. In
every case pilots’ are tasked to comply, even if they are unsure what a
specific SOP compliance requires or don’t like the SOP, the more difficult
charge to the pilot in command. Perhaps this is why pilots find themselves
in a quandary regarding SOP compliance – they are conflicted.
SOPs are developed by airline management and experienced line
pilots in the safety and comfort of an office. Safety, trainability and what is
best for the company are all factors in how SOPs are determined. Along
with personal experience and past practice, they consult the
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manufacturer’s airplane flight crew operating manual and other sources
to determine what SOP is best. “A single pilot sitting in an airplane going
450 knots does not have that luxury, so I believe that adherence to SOPs is
primary to flight safety. No procedure developed on the fly can
compare.” (R. Cunningham, personal communication, February 23,
2011). New initiatives result in new procedures and it is difficult sometimes
for pilots to keep track of which procedure is the current procedure,
especially when the reason for the change to SOP is not explained or
understood. Pilots may feel that the SOP prescribed for a given scenario is
unsafe, complicated, or simply unnecessary. Pilots are opposed to
change, especially when the procedure being replaced was, in their
opinion, was at least as safe, if not more safe than the new SOP (Dismukes
et al., 2007).
Also, because of Captain’s authority, pilots mistakenly believe that
their certificate entitles them to disregard SOP if they have determined
that their way is “more safe.” This is true in the application of
‘recommended practices’, the term applied to specific techniques
trained by the airline. When it comes to recommendations, pilots can
adopt the recommended technique or develop their own (Aircraft
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Operating Manual, 2010). For SOP, except for in an emergency situation
where an emergency has been declared, failure to comply with SOP is a
violation of the certificate they hold which requires them to operate
according to company policies and procedures (FAR/AIM 2011).
Therefore, pilots may believe that the company prescribed way to
operate a jet and the absolute safest way to fly are often not equal.
In a specific airline’s AQP, recurrent training time is often limited
because the goal is to meet the minimum requirements and keep costs
low. According to Rigner and Dekker (2000), today’s airlines are
sometimes faced with limited training time available, and their chosen
training approach may not allow instructors to elaborate where need is
shown because of prescribed tasks that must be accomplished. In other
words, there is a lot to cover in a limited amount of time, which often
results in training deficiencies that may or may not show up in Line
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) or line checks. Updates to current
procedures are distributed to pilots by bulletins, and amended SOP are
sometimes trained by textual description alone. Pilots are expected to
maintain a firm understanding on the execution of current SOP, often
times without receiving any training on that SOP. Therefore, the amount of
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information and training provided with changes to SOP is may not be
adequate.
Several authors state that the lack of understanding of the
implications of disregarding SOP is a factor in a pilot’s decision to violate
SOP. Before FOQA programs, airlines were largely unaware of the specific
configurations their aircraft were operated by a particular pilot on a given
day. With FOQA and ASAP, they can link the pilot to flight performance
data through all phases of flight. Another factor is the protection of the
ASAP program, which protects pilots as long as the violation was
unintentional and not in violation of SOP. Pilots may not have adequate
understanding of the consequences of intentional non compliance.
PINC holds pilots responsible to follow procedures, and except for
emergency situations, they are expected to follow SOP or face the
consequences. The consequences include being violated by the FAA
because the immunity of the ASAP programs will not extend to
intentionally risky behavior. The truth is “they” (the company and FAA)
know what pilots are doing on every flight and the responsibility to comply
with SOP is not only present on a line check. Therefore, pilots may not be
adequately aware of the risk associated with their decision to disregard
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SOP. This is a new change, and once pilots are trained and understand
the risk associated with noncompliance with SOP, compliance may
increase.
The research questions posed by this study are
1. Do Microscope Line Check findings differ following instruction on PINC
and PUNC as compared to pre-instruction findings?
2. Do the top 12 “non-standard” items on the Microscope Line Check
improve in rank amongst top 12 items following instruction on PINC and
PUNC?
3. Do Microscope Line Check findings differ following a corporate
strategy to improve SOP compliance is put into place?
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this research is to determine if increased training of
the risk of noncompliance with SOP will increase airline pilots’ compliance
with SOP. To establish a need for further study, LOSA checks were
accomplished at a major U.S. airline during January of 2010. As a result of
the LOSA checks, it was determined that more emphasis and education
were needed concerning SOP compliance.
Microscope Line Checks (MLC) were conducted on 308 flights in
January and February of 2010. Check airmen were assigned to observe
on randomly selected routes to collect the data and complete the
checks. These MLC were classified as line checks, not LOSA, and
therefore if a pilot were to fail the MLC they would be disqualified and
sent for training in accordance with AQP.
After the high frequency MLC in January through February of 2010,
the airline elected to continue using the same survey on all scheduled line
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checks required by AQP. Additional data was collected through March
2011 and is also used in this research. All data were recorded
anonymously and tested against specific changes to airline training and
policies to determine effect on pilot’s SOP compliance. Finally, the
Institutional Review Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed and
approved the project including the survey questions, proposed sample,
and research methods.

The Survey
The checks utilized a standardized survey of 60 different SOP items.
The survey items were broken down by phase of flight. Each phase of
flight included any checklists to be completed, actions to be taken and
any other specific SOP actions required. There was also a section for
general SOP items, for example “Appearance” or “Point and Shoot used
for all altitude changes” [See appendix A for specific descriptions of each
survey item.] Each item was scored either as “Standard,” “Nonstandard,”
“Not Applicable” or “Not Observed.” The check airmen performing the
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MLC were asked to record comments on each of the “Nonstandard”
items to establish the reason for the discrepancy.
To understand the specifics of each occurrence of noncompliance,
the researcher recorded and analyzed the comments from each of the
flights conducted in January and February of 2010. While this qualitative
data was not used to determine any trends of noncompliance, it was
used to determine which specific initiatives and procedural changes
should be tested for potential effect on SOP compliance.

Corporate Strategy to Improve SOP Compliance
Along with the MLC that began in January, 2010, the company
determined that the LOSA of January 2010 indicated a need to change
its SOP training and better explain what was expected of pilots. To kickoff
the campaign, a poster of a pilot with the banner, “SOP: It’s the only
choice” was placed in the entrance to the operations area of each of
the airline’s crew bases [see appendix C]. Specific training on PINC was
added to the Human Factors training module that was presented to pilots
during initial, transition, upgrade and recurrent training. By August 31,
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2010, all participants had completed this training. On September 1, 2010,
specific training designed to address and stimulate discussion of Captain’s
decision making was added to the Human Factors training module.

Participants
Participants are current and qualified flight crews at a major U.S.
airline. MLC checks were randomly conducted on flights in both domestic
and international flight operations during January, February and March.
Additional MLC data was gathered during the next 12 months during AQP
required line checks. With few exceptions, all flight crew members
(Captains and First Officers) hold a type rating on the aircraft flown. The
check airmen who conducted the MLC are also type rated, current and
qualified captains on the equipment checked.

Protection of Human Subjects
Participants remained anonymous except for the generalized
demographic data queried at the beginning of the survey. The study
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author notified and received written permission from the management of
the respective airline to utilize data collected from the survey. The
Institutional Review Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed and
approved the project including the survey questions, proposed sample,
and research methods.

Potential Biases
The one area of concern for bias is the potential for false-positives
on items found to be “Standard” SOP performance. The MLC is a testing
event, and therefore it is impossible to know if the pilots exhibited
“standard” behavior because they always follow SOP, or if they are
complying with SOP because they are being watched and face dequalification if they fail to comply with SOP. It is unrealistic to expect that
pilots will demonstrate the same behaviors they would if the check airman
were truly an unknown presence. Therefore, any analysis will be limited to
application to SOP compliance with a check airman in the cockpit, as it is
impossible to know if the same compliance will carry over to line
operations (Helmreich, 2003).
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Additionally, some of the participants who were checked during
the random MLC used to establish the baseline for SOP compliance may
have attended Human Factors training prior to their MLC. Statistically,
only 14% of line pilots experienced this training during this period. Because
the MLC were conducted as the company initiative was launched, no
data without this bias existed. The Human Factors training on PINC would
have biased them towards SOP compliance, so using those numbers as a
baseline is more conservative than to have purely unbiased numbers.

Data Analysis
The data will be analyzed to determine if the effect of specific
initiatives on SOP compliance is significant. The baseline data will be
analyzed to determine the top 12 areas of noncompliance. That data will
be ranked and compared with the data collected during the months
after the PINC training was presented to all pilots to determine what
effect, if any, the PINC training had on SOP compliance rates. The data
groups were compared using chi-square to determine any significant
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change in compliance levels between the pre-PINC training and postPINC training time periods.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The data set was divided into two groups, pre-PINC training for the
data collected in January and February of 2010, and post-PINC training
for the data collected after September 1, 2010. The data from the prePINC training flights were ranked based on the number of ‘non-standard’
events in each of the 60 areas tested. The top 12 areas of
noncompliance from the pre-PINC training group were analyzed in this
study.
The first group of data, labeled pre-PINC training, was from the
period before all subjects experienced the Human Factors module
containing PINC training. These data were gathered from 306 randomly
selected flights. Of the 60 areas tested in the survey, the top 12 areas of
non compliance from the January and February 2010 MLC (pre-PINC
training) were ranked below in Table 1.
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The second group of data, labeled post-PINC training, was
collected during flights that were flown after each line pilot at the airline
had received PINC training during the last 9-months. These data were
gathered from 289 flights during which AQP required line checks were
being accomplished. Of the 60 areas tested in the survey, the top 12
areas of noncompliance from the September 2010 through March 2011
MLC (post-PINC training) were ranked in Table 1 (numbers in parenthesis
indicate survey question number):
Table 1. Top 12 non standard items ranking.
Pre-PINC
Training
Rank
(n = 306)

Post-PINC
Training
Rank
(n = 289)

Climb speed policy compliance (29)

1

1

Standardized descent speed compliance (44)

2

6

Appearance (63)

3

12

“Point and Shoot” for all altitude changes (65)

4

7

Before Takeoff checklist (26)

5

3

Before Taxi/Taxi checklist (18)

6

8

Takeoff briefing accomplished (13)

7

10

(G)FMS route/legs verification check (12)

8 (tie)

4

After-Landing - Taxi checklist (57)

8 (tie)

11

Non-standard Item
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Table 1. Top 12 non standard items ranking cont.
Pre-PINC
Training
Rank
(n = 306)

Post-PINC
Training
Rank
(n = 289)

Parking checklist (61)

10

9

Before Starting Engines checklist (16)

11

2

Cruise Checklist (31)

12

5

Non-standard Item

Note: The post-PINC training rankings do not represent the top-12 of all 60
non-standard areas in the post-PINC training group, but a re-ranking of
the top-12 from the pre-PINC training group. The same 60 areas were
tested for SOP compliance on all flights.

Statistical Analysis
The data groups were compared using chi-square to determine any
significant change in compliance levels between the pre-PINC training
and post-PINC training time periods.
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Table 2. Non-standard results.
Pre-PINC
Training
Observed/
expected

Post-PINC
Training
Observed/
Expected

Sig.

Climb speed policy (29)

48/38.8

27/36.2

0.023

Standardized descent speed (44)

28/20.4

12/19.6

0.012

Appearance (63)

22/11.2

0/10.8

0.000

“Point and Shoot” (65)

21/15.7

10/15.3

0.051

Before Takeoff checklist (26)

20/19.0

17/18.0

0.741

Before Taxi/Taxi checklist (18)

18/12.9

7/12.1

0.036

Takeoff briefing (13)

16/10.8

5/10.2

0.022

(G)FMS route/legs check (12)

15/15.3

15/14.7

0.901

After-Landing - Taxi checklist (57)

15/9.3

3/8.7

0.006

Parking checklist (61)

14/10.3

6/9.7

0.088

Before Starting Engines checklist (16)

13/15.9

18/15.1

0.277

Cruise Checklist (31)

12/12.9

13/12.1

0.717

Non-standard Item

Data Summary
Of the top 12 noncompliant areas analyzed for relationship, six of
the 12 showed increased compliance with the specific area of SOP. The
greatest difference between the pre-PINC training and post-PINC training
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groups was in non-standard appearance. Non-standard “Point and
Shoot” used for all altitude changes, was not statistically significant, but
with p = .051, this item approached finding a significant difference
between pre-PINC and post-PINC groups.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The data show that in six of 12 specific areas studied, pilots who
have been exposed to training on PINC will perform SOP in a manner that
the company will grade “standard” on line checks. In all areas (n=12)
except three, there was an overall improvement in SOP compliance. In
two the three cases where the SOP compliance did not improve, the item
tested was a checklist with multiple items, and therefore multiple places
where the non-standard behavior could have been displayed. Further
research into the qualitative section of the MLC form would be useful to
determine the cause of the “non-standard” grading.
Checklist items accounted for two of the six areas with significant
improvement. In both the Before Taxi/Taxi Checklist and the After Landing
-Taxi Checklist, pilots who experienced training on PINC were found to
perform better than pilots who had not received PINC training:
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Table 3. Before Taxi/Taxi Checklist
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

18/12.9

7/12.1

25

Standard

Observed/Expected

286/291.1

280/274.9

566

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

χ2 (1, N = 591) = 4.418, p < .05.

Table 4. After Landing - Taxi Checklist
PINC Status
Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

15/3

3/8.7

18

Standard

Observed/Expected

288/293.7

280/274.3

568

χ2 (1, N = 586) = 7.439, p < .05.
The researcher finds this noteworthy because in the Before Taxi/Taxi
Checklist and After Landing – Taxi Checklist there are 11 (approximately –
depending on fleet type) items on the checklist, and therefore 11 places
to find oneself graded “non-standard” by a check airmen. The specific
checklist items with noted improvement each consist of over 10 individual
checks which could each result in noncompliance. Additionally, the
Before Taxi/Taxi checklist was introduced in 2009 in order to achieve fleet
standardization. Before that time, fleets only had Taxi checklists. The
improvement in compliance could be attributed to pilots becoming more
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familiar with the new procedures as they visited the simulator and
received training by the check airmen on the new change, something
that occurred during the same training cycle they received their PINC
human factors training.
Non-standard descent speed compliance was number two in the
pre-PINC training “non-standard” rankings, and showed improvement to
number six in the post-PINC training rankings.
Table 5. Non-standard Standardized Descent Speed Compliance
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

28/20.4

12/19.6

40

Standard

Observed/Expected

266/273.6

271/263.4

537

χ2 (1, N = 577) = 6.239, p < .05.
The reason for this is twofold: first, “minimum descent speed –
checked” is an item on the first section of the Cruise Checklist. It is a
simple entry (cruise mach/aircraft specific descent speed) called for at a
quiet part of the flight (level off), and the checklist cannot be called
“complete” until it is entered. Second, PINC training specifically
addressed checklist completion. It is interesting to note that the number
12 “non-standard” item in the pre-PINC training rankings was the Cruise
Checklist, which showed no improvement in SOP compliance in post-PINC
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training group, and it actually had one more occurrence of
noncompliance in a smaller number of total flights in the post-PINC
training group.
Table 6. Non-standard Cruise Checklist
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

12/12.9

13/12.1

25

Standard

Observed/Expected

289/288.1

270/270.9

559

χ2 (1, N = 584) = 0.131, p > .05.
In terms of ranking, the Cruise Checklist had the second worst
‘decline’ in ranking between the pre-PINC training ranking and the postPINC training ranking, rising from 12th worst area of non-compliance to 5th.
“Minimum Descent Speed – Checked” is on the Cruise Checklist. Further
research into the comments on “non-standard” grades on non-standard
Cruise Checklist, is required to understand the reason for the “nonstandard” marks.
Non-standard climb speed policy compliance showed significant
improvement from the pre-PINC training group to the post-PINC training
group, yet it still remained the number one area of noncompliance in the
post-PINC training group.
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Table 7. Non-standard Climb Speed Policy Compliance
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

48/38.8

27/36.2

75

Standard

Observed/Expected

255/264.2

256/246.8

511

χ2(1, N = 586) = 5.205, p < .05.
The airline introduced the climb speed policy in 2009 in the interest of
minimizing fuel burn and standardizing fleets. Unlike non-standard
descent speed, “climb speed” is not an item on any checklist. It is
supposed to be entered into the flight management computer during the
preflight, and it is covered under the umbrella of the “CDU – Checked”
response on the Before Starting Engines Checklist. Before the policy was
introduced, pilots used a variety of recommended practices to program
their climb speeds (i.e., flight plan climb speed, transitioning to cruise
mach number), but there was no existing SOP for the entry of a climb
speed. The new climb speed policy was distributed by pink bulletin as an
amendment to the Aircraft Operating Manual, and at first a reminder was
printed out in the appended messages portion of every flight plan. This
“reminder” was removed at some point after the pre-PINC training group
MLCs took place. The Standard Climb Speeds are currently located in the
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aircraft operating manual in the Climb – Cruise – Descent section,
something not normally accessed during normal preflight procedures.
Non-standard takeoff briefing accomplished was unique as it was
the only item in the top-12 non-standard ranking with an expanded
definition of which SOP items check airmen should be looking for. The
description lists “Taxi Route, Hot Spots, SID, FM II special procedures,
engine out, terrain considerations (MEA, MSA, Grid MORA), Transition
Altitude, takeoff.” There results showed that pilots who had received PINC
training were more compliant with SOP than the pre-PINC training pilots, p
= .022.
Table 8. Non-standard Takeoff Briefing
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

16/10.8

5/10.2

21

Standard

Observed/Expected

287/292.2

279/273.8

566

χ2 (1, N = 587) = 5.266, p < .05.
This validates the researchers belief that PINC training will increase SOP
compliance, but in the pursuit of understanding the SOP for a takeoff
briefing the researcher found no place in the Aircraft Operating Manuals
or in the Flight Operations Manual where all these requirements are listed
as SOP.
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In fact, this it all that is included about takeoff briefings in the
Aircraft Operating Manual [items in bold in original document for
emphasis]:
The takeoff briefing consists of (as a minimum):


Designate the pilot-flying



Rejected takeoff considerations



Any other contingencies (if applicable).

The briefing is completed at the gate, to the extent possible,
to allow both pilots to focus on taxi operations after gate
departure. Last minute clearance changes from ATC (taxi or
departure) will be verbalized by the F/O and verified by the
Captain. Checklist items covering the departure procedure
need not be briefed unless some contingency or exception
exists. When required, the Captain will conduct whatever
briefing is appropriate to the situation (e.g., poor weather,
inexperienced crew member, etc.). The Captain, at his / her
discretion, may delegate the briefing to the F/O (Pilot-Flying),
with the understanding the Captain will take the aircraft in
the event of an RTO in compliance with current policy.”
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Followed by this:
“The takeoff briefing will be conducted by the Captain (or at
the Captain’s discretion, the Pilot-Flying) at the gate and
include, as a minimum:


Designate the pilot-flying



Rejected takeoff considerations.

Contingencies, if appropriate:


Departure procedure (required only if not covered
previously by checklist completion or if revised by
ATC)



Airport specific engine failure profile



Takeoff alternate



Takeoff weather considerations



Runway surface conditions



Terrain considerations



Any other variables associated with the taxi and
takeoff. (Aircraft Operating Manual, 2010)

Of those listed on the MLC form, standard instrument departure (SID),
engine out, terrain and takeoff are the only ones that the researcher
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could find in the governing books of the airlines SOP. It would be
expected that a pilot could decide that in order to effectively brief terrain
considerations, the minimum safe altitude (MSA) should be briefed, or that
it is wise to brief the planned taxi route, but that would be considered
recommended technique, not SOP.
The term “Hot Spots” is not found in any of the manuals, nor is there
any requirement to brief the taxi route. International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) defines a hot spot as a location on an airport
movement area that has historically been at high risk for collisions or
runway incursions (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). These areas are
highlighted on airport charts to increase awareness for pilots and drivers.
The qualitative comments from the pre-PINC training group explain why
the “non-standard” mark was given included, “Captain did not brief ‘hot
spots’ along planned taxi routing” and “No taxi route brief.” It seems
there might be some confusion in the training department as to what the
official SOP is for the takeoff briefing. This exemplifies the need for simple,
clear, concise and prescriptive SOP so that everyone, pilots and airline
training departments, understands what is expected. (Aviation Glossary,
2010)
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The largest improvement in SOP compliance was found in nonstandard appearance.
Table 9. Non-standard Appearance
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

22/11.2

0/10.8

22

Standard

Observed/Expected

272/282.2

285/274.2

557

χ2 (1, N = 579) = 22.169, p < .05.
This standardized residual far exceeded 1.96 (z = 3.2) and the actual p < .
001. While it is possible to draw the conclusion that PINC training had an
incredible effect on pilots appearance, it is interesting to also note that
the flight department at this particular airline distributed a letter to all pilots
signed by a majority of the chief pilots indicating that the culture of
uniform compliance is changing. Another possible contributing factor
was a change in leadership that was accompanied by a less-restrictive
hat and tie policy “rumor”. That rumor became official in a recent revision
to the carriers flight operations manual. Analysis of the pre-PINC training
data comments to understand how many of them were hat and tie
related might reveal fewer non-standard appearance scores if the current
policy were applied to pre-PINC training data. Regardless, the airline can
be satisfied to know that they met the seemingly unachievable goal of
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perfect compliance with SOP in this one area in the post-PINC training line
checks.
Although not significant, non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for all
altitude changes did recognize improvements between the pre- and
post-PINC training groups. The difference between post-PINC training
pilots approached significant improvement over the pre-PINC training
group, p = .051.
Table 10. Non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for All Altitude Changes
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

21/15.7

10/15.3

31

Standard

Observed/Expected

270/275.3

273/267.7

543

χ2 (1, N = 574) = 3.809, p > .05.
While the airline had a coincidental policy of limiting SOP changes during
the period of the data collection, this particular item did have a change
effective April 8, 2010. This change modified the “Point and Shoot” that
required the PM to change the altitude, point at the window, state the
altitude and wait for the PF to verbally acknowledge and point, or “shoot”
at the altitude window. The new policy got rid of the need for the PF to
“shoot” the window and now required only a verbal acknowledgement of
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the newly assigned altitude. In the pre-PINC training group there were 21
non-standard marks from 291 flights, and only 10 non-standard marks out
of the 283 post-PINC training flights. While the findings were not
significant, it is possible that the simplification of procedures could have
had an impact on the top-12 rankings, moving from 4th least compliant
item in the pre-PINC training to 7th in the post-PINC training group.
Of the remaining items to be discussed, three of them are checklists
that showed no significant difference between the pre-PINC training and
post-PINC training data. In fact, the non-standard marks on the Before
Starting Engines, Before Takeoff and Parking Checklists all had worse
rankings on the post-PINC training top-12 than on the pre-PINC training
top-12.
Table 11. Non-standard Before Starting Engine Checklist
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

13/15.9

18/15.1

31

Standard

Observed/Expected

291/288.1

269/271.9

560

χ2 (1, N = 591) = 1.183, p > .05.
The Before Starting Engines Checklist compliance item was ranked 11th
worst pre-PINC training to 2nd worst post-PINC training, the greatest
increase in rank of all items. The researcher believes that due to the large
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number of items on a checklist, it is easy to find something non-standard
which would deem the entire checklist non-standard. On one fleet, the
Parking Checklist’s non-standard comments involved six different checklist
items, three of which were only marked non-standard on a single flight.
Table 12. Non-standard Parking Checklist
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

14/10.3

6/9.7

20

Standard

Observed/Expected

287/290.7

280/276.3

567

χ2 (1, N = 587) = 2.905, p >.05.
It is important to study further the source of these non-standard marks and
determine which areas can be focused on to improve pilot’s
understanding of SOP on normal checklists.
The final item for discussion is item 12, non-standard (G)FMS route/
legs verification check. Regarding item 12, the SOP for this is not new.
Table 13. Non-standard (G)FMS Route/Legs Verification Check
PINC Status

Pre-PINC
Training

Post-PINC
Training

Total

Non-Standard

Observed/Expected

15/15.3

15/14.7

30

Standard

Observed/Expected

286/285.7

273/273.3

559

χ2 (1, N = 589) = 0.015, p > .05.
This item’s ranking moved from 8th least compliant area to 4th least
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compliant, the third worst decline in rank. The researcher found the SOP
for this item to be fairly consistent in all fleets, with variations in the types of
(G)FMS the only reason for between-fleet differences. The interesting
finding about this data was that of the 30 flights found non-standard, 25 of
them (83.33%) were flown on domestic routes.
A possible explanation for this finding is that international routes are
complex and often flown over areas without reliable ground based
navigational aids or radar coverage, the flight plan is checked against
the (G)FMS for accuracy many times. Domestic flights are almost always
in radar coverage, routes are familiar, and while the chance for violation
is just as prevalent as it is on international routes, the fear of a gross
navigational error fine simply doesn’t exist. This theory could be
researched further to understand if there is a significant difference in
(G)FMS route/legs check compliance between domestic and
international flights and, if so, explore the check airmen’s comments to
further understand potential solutions to increase domestic pilots
awareness of how to comply and the risk of noncompliance.
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Recommendations
Due to the significant findings of improvement in the post-PINC
training group in six of the 12 areas tested, this researcher feels that PINC
training should continue to be a part of human factors training.
Additionally, the airline should continue to look for new ways to increase
pilot’s understanding of the consequences of choosing to disregard SOP.
As of September 1, 2010, Captain’s decision making training was added
to the PINC training. However, in order to increase the safety culture the
airline should provide assertiveness training to the First Officers. This
training should involve both Captains and First Officers with the goal of
establishing roles and expectations. First Officers must respect the role of
the Captain while helping the Captain comply with SOP, and alerting the
Captain to any deviation from SOP is part of that. This training has the
potential to bring the CRM aspect of SOP full circle and this step is vitally
necessary in pursuit of a more SOP compliant operation and improvement
in the overall safety culture of the airline.
To simplify SOP compliance, a Quick Reference Card specific to
each fleet should be developed. In the case of Climb Speed
compliance, the card would serve to make complicated Climb Speed
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tables easily available for pilots to crosscheck every flight. This card could
be used as a tool to help pilots comply with all items required on the
Takeoff briefing. This tool should also include similar lists for Crew Change
briefings for 3- or 4-pilot crews and for the Approach briefing called for on
the Descent Checklist. Aircraft limitations as well as other
recommendations from line pilots could be added as well.
Research into the causes of non-standard procedure compliance in
the MLC comments section could reveal additional items to include on
the Quick Reference Card. The card should be administered not as a
recommended tool, but as SOP for all crewmembers to reference the
card, at least in the case of multiple item briefings.
Because six of the top-12 areas of noncompliance were checklist
related, there are two recommendations to help improve in checklist SOP.
First, there were a number of “no ‘checklist complete’ call out” and
“incorrect response to a couple of items” qualitative remarks on all the
checklists that made the top-12. Checklist discipline is something that
some pilots make a daily practice of, while others make sure they brushup on it for whenever they need to go to training. If the pilots are
encouraged in training to make line operations checklist discipline just as
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stringent as it is in training, the culture could shift quickly to be more SOP
compliant. First Officers should feel compelled to correct their Captains if
they say, “Set” when they should say, “Checked,” for example, and
Captains should correct First Officers on incorrect responses to challenge
and response items when they are the pilot monitoring (PM). The
responsibility for good checklist discipline falls on both Captains and First
Officers, and the one holding the card and reading the checklist has all
the answers in their hand.
The Cruise Checklist was one of the least affected items between the
pre-PINC training and post-PINC training groups, and its ranking went from
12th-worst to 5th-worst between groups. This checklist covers the portion of
the flight from “top-of-climb” through “Just Prior to Top-of-Descent,” which
might be 30-minutes on a domestic leg, but can easily exceed 12 hours
on international flights. This means that the checklist is in progress and
awaiting completion for the majority of many flights. The researcher
recommends consideration of establishing two or three separate
checklists for the cruise portion of flight as this may make it more
reasonable to expect pilots to remember to comply with all SOP even on
the longest of flights. Other modifications recommended are to add
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“Climb Speed – set” to the Before Starting Engines Checklist and “Seat Belt
Sign - ON” to the Just Prior to Top-of-Descent portion of the Cruise
Checklist.
One of the most common areas of noncompliance on the After
Landing – Taxi Checklist was not an actual line item on the checklist, but
an arrival procedure. First Officers are required to make an arrival PA
immediately after gate arrival. There were many cases of First Officers
making the announcement approaching the gate, which does not
comply with SOP. Additionally, the Captains immediate action item upon
gate arrival is to set the parking brake and turn off the seat belt sign.
According to SOP, these actions must be performed immediately
upon gate arrival, which leaves the First Officer announcing, "Ladies and
gentlemen, please remain seated until the Captain has turned off the
seat belt sign. Flight Attendants prepare for arrival and cross check," two
to three-seconds after the Captain has turned off the sign. If the First
Officer makes the PA early or the Captain delays the immediate action of
turning off the sign, they are not complying with SOP. The first portion of
the PA is to prevent passengers from unbuckling and getting hurt in the
last few precious feet of their flight, and the second portion is to let flight
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attendants know that the brake is parked, aircraft is at the gate, and it is
safe to disarm their doors.
The SOP should be modified so that the "Ladies and gentlemen,
please remain seated until the Captain has turned off the seat belt sign,”
portion of the PA is announced once the parking area has been cleared
and the aircraft will immediately proceed to the gate. Once the parking
brake is set at the gate, the First Officer can announce, “Flight Attendants
prepare for arrival and cross check." This modification allows for the
reminder to remain seated with seat belts fastened to precede the
seatbelt sign being turned off, the flight attendants to disarm the doors
only after aircraft arrival, and would bring SOP in line with the intention to
keep passengers and flight attendants safe.
One of the biggest challenges for many U.S. major airlines is that they
essentially operate two different airlines, one domestic and one
international. They have short-haul and long-haul flights and a variety of
fleets enlisted to accomplish the goal of safely moving people. In the
goal of standardization, these differences cannot be ignored. Nonstandard (G)FMS route/legs verification check, brought to light a
difference between compliance rates domestic and international flights.
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If it is the airlines plan to standardize fleets in this operating area, it is
important that this procedure is highlighted and the reason behind
checking the paper flight plan with the electronic flight plan is brought to
light. Pilots are frustrated when they are asked to do something because
it is SOP, especially when it seems to be excessively redundant for routes
they routinely fly. There are many reasons why this route/legs check is
important, and the application of this procedure to domestic flights
makes sense because there is a potential for mistakes if the procedure is
not conducted properly. The skies are getting more populated, and ATC
separation requirements are shrinking. Educating pilots on the “how?”
and “why?” of a procedure that they may have deemed unnecessary
could shift their thinking.
The final recommendation of the researcher is in all development of
training and new SOPs, differences between fleets and pilot’s aversion to
change must be acknowledged and addressed to effectively increase
SOP compliance.
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Future Research
The question as to whether increased understanding, knowledge
and awareness of individual airline SOP and the risk of noncompliance
with SOP increase airline pilot’s compliance with SOP has been only
partially explored by the research project, and further research is required
to more fully answer the question. It was the original intention of the
researcher to measure the effect of specific training on the 757/767 fleet’s
SOP compliance rates, but due to time constraints there was not enough
data to complete that specific portion of the research. That training will
be distributed to the pilots on the 757/767 and the data should be
available for analysis in July 2011. That training is specifically focused on
the top-10 areas of noncompliance on the 757/767 fleet and the
information to be distributed can be found in appendix C.
Because the data was collected on multiple fleets in both domestic
and international operations on long-haul and short-haul flights, further
investigation comparing data in these groups could lead to better
understanding of specific areas where SOP compliance rates may differ.
This research could serve to better explain the conditions under which
greater rates of noncompliance exist in certain operations, thereby
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allowing training to be designed to directly address the problem area.
This would help to avoid blanket solutions that, applied company wide,
are often rejected by the groups not exhibiting the noncompliant
behavior. This data is already available for further analysis, and this
prescriptive application of new SOP to problem areas has the potential to
be well received by pilots who understand why SOP is being changed
and how to use the new SOP. Additionally, the airline should consider a
study of their current checklist procedures to determine if there is any
room for improvement or change.
It is also recommended that the airline to use future data to
understand the effect of non-training events on SOP compliance. The
PINC training that pilots received that was tested for this research project
was an example of an external motivator for compliance. If pilots don’t
comply with SOP, they risk being violated. This external motivator, while
shown by this study to be effective, is defined as a negative motivator.
The U.S. Navy publishes this about the use of negative motivation on
subordinates:
Fear activates such negative incentives as threat of punishment or
restriction of personal needs. Negative motivation, however, often
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destroys morale; and effectiveness will decline as morale declines.
Long-term or frequent use of negative motivation is self-defeating.
(U.S. Navy, 2010, p. 4-17)
Future research into the effects of positive external motivators like
improved working conditions due to settled union labor disputes, positive
corporate financial reports, and the announcement of growth with new
airplanes, route, or hiring of new pilots should be conducted. This
research could reveal if improved morale and the possible effect of a less
distracted cockpit environment could lead to an increase in SOP
compliance. Additional research could answer if the removal of financial
pressures on pilots increase SOP compliance. Data gathered during times
of expansion could compare new Captains to Captains who have been
in the left seat for five years or more to determine who is more SOP
compliant. These and many other questions could be analyzed to better
understand what motivates pilots to comply with SOP.
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Conclusion
Due human error, it is not possible for airlines to ever achieve 100%
compliance with SOP, no matter how much training, clarification and
understanding pilots have of existing SOP. Pilots will make mistakes, but
the determination to pursue perfect SOP compliance should be a part of
a pilot’s commitment to professionalism just as primum nil nocere, “first, do
no harm,” is a fundamental part of physician’s ethics training in medical
school. It is an attitude of excellence, a foundation that serves to underlie
the best, most safe operation every time they are charged with the
command of an aircraft full of trusting passengers.
The amount of man-machine interaction required in the operation
of highly automated aircraft flown by airlines today is negligible when
compared to the virtually non-automated 707 or even the 727. This has
reduced the need for pilots to ‘do’ and increased the need for pilots to
‘monitor’. Bhana (2010) states, “The paradigm shift is significant, as it
requires a different pilot skill set to be added to the traditional ‘stick and
rudder’ skills.” (p. 14). Couple this threat of complacency with FOQA and
the threat of PINC and PUNC, and it is vividly apparent that today’s airline
pilots are operating in a different world in 2011 than they were even 5
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years ago, and it is drastically different from the environment 15 to 35
years ago when most of today’s U.S. major airline pilots learned to fly.
Acknowledgement of that change requires understanding of the
implications that accompany FOQA, PINC, PUNC and automation,
bringing to light the fundamental need for SOP compliance.
Aristotle once said, “Excellence is an art won by training and
habituation. We do not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence,
but we rather have those because we have acted rightly. We are what
we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit (n.d.)” John
Hale, the Vice President of Flight at American Airlines has been credited
with coining the phrase ‘aggressively safe.’ In his introduction to the Flight
Operations Manual he states, “We just do not have the luxury of being
anything but excellent every single time we climb into the cockpit” (Hale,
2011). Aggressively safe is an attitude he asks his pilots to adopt every
time they fly, a proactive approach to flying in pursuit of preparation for
the unknown threats that absolutely exist. He believes that, like in
defensive driving, we must pursue safety throughout all phases of flight
because the threat of complacency is real. SOP compliance is the
foundation to aggressively safe operations.
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If airlines can provide pilots with SOP that are simple, clear, concise
and prescriptive and provide pilots with the training to understand the
reason for SOP and how to successfully apply it and tools to make
compliance easy, they will have done their part. This research established
that training on the “because I said so” that is the risk of PINC did increase
SOP compliance. While SOP compliance is the goal, if pilots receive
training, clarification and achieve understanding of the ‘why?’ and
‘how?’ of SOP, they will be far more motivated to do the right thing.
“Because I said so,” works, but “because it is the right thing to do,”
changes the motivation from fear to one where the satisfaction of
complying with SOP because they understand and can justify it as the
right thing to do positively motivates pilots and engages them as
professionals to be an important contributor to the airline’s safety culture.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Microscope Line Checks Non-standard Item Legend
6)Non-standard Pilot license and Medical Certificate checked
7)Non-standard Fuel planning coordination with dispatch
8)Non-standard Preflight and Walk Around inspections complete
9)Non-standard F/A briefing accomplished: Turbulence, security,
enroute delays, cabin/galley E6 logbook write-ups, Gen Decs/
Customs forms. If routed over 66N over Greenland did Captain
request F/A review of 66N Supplemental O2 unit?
10)Non-standard Cold Weather Operations - Deice/Anti-Ice
procedures compliance
11)Non-standard check (G)FMS against flight plan and clearance
12)Non-standard (G)FMS route/legs verification check
13)Non-standard Takeoff briefing accomplished: Taxi Route, Hot Spots,
SID, FM II special procedures, engine out, terrain considerations
(MEA,MSA,Grid MORA), Transition Altitude, takeoff
14)Non-standard Captain manages workload during re-flight phase to
assure logbook review and flight plan crosscheck concerning MEL/
CDL items thorough and complete
15)Non-standard ETOPS 1 or 2 sign-off check
16)Non-standard Before Starting Engines checklist
17)Non standard Starting Engines Procedure compliance
18)Non standard Before Taxi/Taxi checklist
19)Non-standard Proper clearing of the area before taxi
20)Non-standard no head down procedures performed while in the
ramp area during taxi
21)Non-standard Airport Diagram in use by all pilots
22)Non-standard Captain's attention primarily focused on taxi
23)Non-standard Captain and F/O review of takeoff data
24)Non-standard Single Engine Taxi procedures
25)Non-standard communications using standard/ICAO phraseology
26)Non-standard Before Takeoff checklist
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27)Non-standard Terrain/Obstacle awareness on departure
28)Non-standard crew comply with airspeed/altitude restrictions and
navigation parameters on SID
29)Non-standard climb speed policy compliance
30)Non-standard After Takeoff - Climb checklist
31)Non-standard Cruise Checklist
32)Non-standard Oceanic Clearance procedure compliance
33)Non-standard Crew properly maintained AIREP form
34)Non-standard Circle and Tick procedure compliance
35)Non-standard Required ATC position reports and plotting
compliance
36)Non-standard ATC communications compliance (including FIR
crossing requirements)
37)Non-standard briefing on crew change, who is PIC, alternates,
weather, etc.
38)Non-standard communication compliance: HF SELCAL check,
company position reports, etc.
39)Non-standard SLOP in North Atlantic/North Pacific
40)Non-standard MTCP procedures
41)Non-standard Fuel Saving procedures
42)Non-standard Cold Fuel procedures
43)Non-standard Descent Checklist
44)Non-standard Standardized descent speed compliance
45)Non-standard approach briefing accomplished (timing, content,
accuracy, terrain considerations - MEA, MSA, Grid MORA - transition
altitude)
46)Non-standard STAR navigation, speed and altitude compliance in
terminal area
47)Non-standard Before Landing checklist
48)Non-standard Contaminated Runway Operations and Landing
Performance Check
51)Non-standard Landing Configuration - gear and flaps by 1000' AFL
52)Non-standard Stabilized approach by 1000' IMC, 500' VMC
53)Non-standard On visual approach, used all available nav-aids
54)Non-standard Touchdown point (centerline, touchdown zone)
55)Non-standard Crew Executed a go-around
56)Non-standard Communications using standard/ICAO phraseology
57)Non-standard After-Landing - Taxi checklist
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58)Non-standard Airport Diagram out and referenced by all pilots
59)Non-standard Single Engine Taxi procedures
60)Non standard crew ensures equipment clearance is adequate
during gate arrival
61)Non-standard Parking checklist
62)Non-standard APU procedures with External Power connected
63)Non-standard Appearance
64)Non-standard Sterile cockpit procedures compliance
65)Non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for all altitude changes
66)Non-standard Read back of all clearances per Flight Manual Part 1
67)Non-standard Cockpit door security
68)Non-standard communication with F/As when approaching/
entering turbulence procedures
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APPENDIX B
Survey
!
Microscope!Observation!Form!
!
!
!
!
!
Flight Information
Enter the following information concerning the flight:
1.
Fleet Type
! B777 ! B767 ! B757 ! B737 ! MD80
2.

Flight Date

3.

Check Airman (Name and Employee #)

4.

!
5.

Captain’s Crew Base
DFW ! LAX ! LGA
Departure Station

Boardmail!to:!
Captain!Bart!Roberts!
MD!843!GSWFA!

Flight No.

!

MIA

!

ORD

!

SFO

Destination Station

!

DCA

!

STL

!

BOS

Diversion Station

Pre-Departure
6.
Pilot License (English Proficient) and Medical Certificate checked
! Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable ! Not Observed
7.

!

Fuel planning coordination with dispatch
Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable

!

Not Observed

!

Not Observed

Captain ADD fuel? Quantity and reason why?

8.

!

Preflight and Walk Around Inspections completed
Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable

9.
F/A briefing accomplished: Turbulence, security, enroute delays, cabin/galley E6
logbook write-ups, Gen Decs/Customs forms. If routed north of 66N over Greenland did Captain
request F/A review of 66N Supplemental O2 unit?
! Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable ! Not Observed
10.

!

Cold Weather Operations – Deice/Anti-Ice Procedures compliance
Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable ! Not Observed

!

Check (G)FMS against flight plan and clearance
Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable

!

Not Observed

!

(G)FMS Route/Legs Verification Check
Standard ! Non-Standard ! Not Applicable

!

Not Observed

11.

12.

!"#!"!$%
!

&'()%!%
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APPENDIX C
Corporate Strategy Poster
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APPENDIX D
Briefing Bulletin for Future Research

Greeting 767 Crews! My name is Carrie Giles and I am completing my Masters in Aviation at the
University of North Dakota, and that is the reason for this bulletin. I am in hot pursuit of better
ways to educate and train pilots in the realm of Standard Operating Procedures, better known as
SOP. In light of the current environment it is easy to understand that SOP compliance might not
be the most prominent thing on your radar, so I appreciate you taking the time to read this.
Compliance with SOP is something that Captains are tasked with each time they sign the flight
plan, and First officers are responsible to speak up whenever SOP are not being followed. When
it comes to flight, day in and day out, your certificates and operating manuals require that you
follow SOP to the letter. This might sound easy, but SOP seem to change all the time, and one
must pay close attention to stay up-to-date on current SOP. So, professional pilot, do you know
757/767 SOP?
In February and March of 2010 Microscope Line Checks (MLC) were accomplished to determine
the level of SOP compliance on all fleets. Crews were marked either ʻStandardʼ or ʻNonStandardʼ in 60 different areas. The data gathered from those checks was analyzed to determine
the top 10 deficient areas for the 757/767 fleet. Examples of non-standard marks from those
MLC will be given for the top 10 areas in order to highlight the discrepancies and explain what AA
SOP are. Chances are you are on top of most of these, but in case you missed a change or
simply forgot something since your last training, this information is provided to help you. My hope
is that this information will help to increase your understanding of SOP so that you and your crew
are 100% compliant the next time a check-airmen shows up on your jet-bridge.
NOTE: Non-standard operating procedures were noted in a variety of areas
indicated in bold. These are the highlights – for more please refer to 767
training page on AA Pilots.

#1 - NON-STANDARD CLIMB SPEED POLICY COMPLIANCE - 45 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“Didn’t program CLB speeds in FMS.”
“The initial climb speed/Alt. was not entered on CDU climb page. V-NAV
used after takeoff.” “Climbed with full power vs. CLM 2, then CLM 1.
Used ECON SPD (330/.82) to CLM with (instead of 300/.80).”
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“Standard speed climb profile not entered into FMC until discovered by
Captain climbing through FL180.”
“Debriefed CA & FO on selecting flaps to 5 degrees on a 15 degree flap
T.O. prior to the standard 3000’ AGL flap retraction altitude for standard
ICAO noise abatement procedure in Europe.”
“Out of 10K used ECON CLB. speed of 345 kts. to climb. Flying VNAV
SPD in CLB to CRZ ALT, FL 330. Full CLB speed reselected out of
16,000’ (climb rate was down at 1500’/min due to extremely high IAS of
345 kts.)” “Captain used approx. 280 KIAS during climb. Asked what
normal 757 climb speed was - he said about 280-290 KIAS. I said
normal = 300 KIAS, Turbulent air penetration = 290 KIAS.”
 On Pre-flight checklist:
oCLIMB SPEEDS...EDIT: Enter climb speed on the FMC CLB page SEL SPD at
2L.
 On After Takeoff - Climb Checklist:
oTHRUST RATING PANEL......................... Upon reaching 250 knots, select: 757–
CLB 2, 767 – CLB
 On the 757, when the rate of climb falls below approximately 1000 feet
per minute, select “CLB 1” or “CLB”, as appropriate.
Recommendation: Enter Climb Speeds during FMC loading right after takeoff data (write the
numbers on Normal Procedures checklist - the bottom of the first panel is a good spot).
Aircraft
Weight
Speed
757, 767-200 and 767-300
up to 300,000 lbs
300 kts / M .80
767-300
above 300 to 350,000 lbs
310 kts / M .80
767-300
above 350 to 408,000 lbs
320 kts / M .80
Non-Pegasus - See Systems 65.7: Climb (CLB) Page: This page will display a nonrestricted 250 knot climb to 10,000 feet, unless intervening speed or altitudes had been
previously entered.
Pegasus - VNAV Page - See Systems 66.14: The VNAV Key displays CLB, CRZ and DES
pages. Pressing VNAV on the ground, during takeoff, or climb shows the CLB page. The
only difference on the CLB page is the title. Speed displays the type of climb, e.g., V2 + 20,
250

#2 - NON-STANDARD AFTER LANDING – TAXI CHECKLIST - 27 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“CA turning autobrake sw. to off on taxi-in - debriefed.”
“Reached down and manually turned off autobrake selector while on
landing rollout.”
“Crew threw a couple of switches on the parking checklist, while
taxiing.”
“F/O did not notice that Capt. had not turned strobe lights off after
landing and announced checklist complete.”
“Flaps not left at 20 degrees after approach in icing conditions.”
“APU non-std. start”
“FO reaches over and turns off the auto brakes switch while the aircraft
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is still on the centerline of the runway. Capt. had already overridden the
autobrakes well before this.”
“FO starts after landing (directed by CA) as we came up to hold short
24L (land 24R). FO head down till we stopped at RWY.”
“Remember - the flight is not over until the parking checklist is
complete and the cockpit door is locked on the way out
 With the exception of the Autopilots (which are normal runway items) no other item
on this checklist should be accomplished until clear of runway.
 Autobrake selector should not be turned off until the Parking Checklist flow as
accomplished by the Captain. Do not reach down while on the runway or
taxiing to turn off the switch.
 Both pilots will monitor the appropriate tower frequency when number one in
position to cross an active runway. Anytime the aircraft is cleared to hold short
of or cross an active runway, the Captain and FO will verbally confirm the
clearance with each other.
 Icing Conditions - Flap Policy FLAPS... RETRACT to 20. Advise station by radio, if
possible, or upon reaching gate position, of the need for a check of the flap area.
Deicing personnel or flight crew must check the inboard flap wells for snow, ice, or
slush accumulation. Prior to next departure, any snow, slush, or ice accumulation
will be removed by deicing before retracting the flaps.
 Engine Cooldown Period For the 757, allow 1 minute after landing before shutting
down the engine to permit the hot section to thermally stabilize. For the 767, allow
at least 3 minutes after landing before shutting the engine down for cooldown. Use
a thrust setting no higher than that normally used for taxi.
 APU should normally be started 2 minutes prior to gate arrival to allow engines to
be shut down upon gate arrival, and to provide pneumatic pressure for proper
closing of the engine bleed valves.
 When all items have been accomplished, the First Officer will advise – “After
landing checklist complete.”

#3 - NON-STANDARD STANDARDIZED DESCENT SPEED COMPLIANCE - 22
OCCURENCES

Examples from MLC comments:
“Did not enter STD descent SPDS”
“Did not use STD descent speeds - debriefed.”
“Descended at 265 kts, did not notice mach to IAS changeover - did
slow to 250 KIAS @ 10K - that’s where they noticed.”
“Programed and flew 320 kt. descend. Was not trying to make up time
(no discussion of this). FLT was ARR MCO for shutdown for the night.”
“No ATC speeds given - Capt. flew other than standard speed.”
 On Cruise Checklist: MINIMUM DESCENT SPEED...CHECK
oVerify minimum descent speed (cruise mach / 290 knots in domestic airspace) is
entered in FMC.
 Standardized Descent Speed Policy:
oAt domestic stations use cruise mach, then 290 knots as a planned descent speed.
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o Use this speed rather than Cost Index generated descent speeds. If another speed
is desired, coordinate with ATC.
oOutside domestic airspace, consider an optimum (CI generated) descent speed into
those destinations where experience and judgment indicate no ATC conflict.
Enter this speed into the FMC before descent.

#4 - NON-STANDARD STARTING ENGINES CHECKLIST - 18 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“CA & FO mistakenly believe CTR FUEL PUMPS could remain OFF until
after takeoff if center tank quantity is less than 5000 LBS, turn on at
cruise. Debriefed, to follow CL, turn pumps on before engine start, to
ensure pumps operate after engine start and before take-off.”
“Did not have proper response to a couple of checklist items.”
“Checklist - pressurization - auto - set - landing altitude was not
correctly set. FO caught it during cruise.”
“Hydraulic pumps were turned on ‘left to right’ instead of ‘right to left’.”
“All 3 IRUs not checked on BSC.”
“Captain airspeed bugs incorrectly set. Set Ref 20, not V2 + 20.”
“FO/FB - inserted 4 digit APU hour meter reading in ACARS, Pegasus
FMS, instead of 3 digits + A/D. Both for Dept. and Arrival.”
 CDU...SET and CHECKED means that PERF page/ T/O page agree w/TPS, CDU data
agree with clearance and that Pre-departure clearance route has been properly entered.
 APU Hourmeter - PEGASUS aircraft - INDEX 1/2 – MESSAGES – STATUS – APU HOURS
– Enter last 3-digits of the APU hourmeter followed by A for arrival or D for
departure. Sent automatically.
 FUEL PUMPS…ON: If center tank contains fuel: Turn switches on, regardless of
quantity. Verify both Center Tank Fuel Pump Low PRESS lights are illuminated and CTR
L FUEL PUMP and CTR R FUEL PUMP EICAS messages are displayed.
 HYDRAULIC PUMPS...ON / AUTO: Pressurize Right System first to prevent fluid
transfer.
o757 - Electric Pump Switches (R, C, & L) – ON - Center No. 2 PRESS light will be
illuminated until an engine is started. Engine Pump Switches – Check ON
o767 - Demand Pump Selectors (R, C, & L) – AUTO Primary Pump Switches – ON Center No. 2 PRESS Light will be illuminated
 Do not release brakes until doors are closed and the groundman and do not release
brakes until doors are closed and the groundman and Ramp/Ground Control have
cleared the aircraft to push.
 When all items have been accomplished, the First Officer will advise the Captain –
“Before Starting Engines checklist complete.”

#5 - NON-STANDARD BEFORE TAKEOFF CHECKLIST - 17 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“Captain did not brief ‘hot spots’ along planned taxi routing.”
“Captain displayed complacency with respect to CRM and D & R briefings were minimal, less than what we would consider normal for a
crew that is paired together regularly. LAS eng. out was touched on
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but not briefed, taxi out and taxi in routes not briefed. Captain
wascompletely debriefed with respect to these requirements.”
“No taxi route brief.”
“I did not hear the crew discuss the E/O NOTAM procedure for the
departure RWY.”
“Capt. Pre. Dept. brief could have included more about obstacle & wx.
avoidance.”
“Capt. did not brief expected taxi out route, FO had to go heads down
to check (pull out of book) the DFW standard taxi routes.”
“The TPS had 4R as the top RWY of the 5. The actual takeoff RWY was
RWY09. The FMC loads 4R which the crew properly changed to
RWY09. Then the closeout came which “reset” the FMC takeoff page to
RWY 4R. TPS had 64C setting while RWY 09 requires 59C. Neither pilot
caught the fact that they had too little power for takeoff on the shorter
RWY 09. The check airmen had to stop the crew from taking off and
have them correct the takeoff power to the proper setting in the FMC.
The check airman busted the crew’s domestic quals.”
 Non-standard response to checklist items was noted in reference to entire checklist
 MAP DISPLAY... CHECKED, RUNWAY ___‡ BOTH CAPTAIN AND FO MUST RESPOND
“Checked, Runway ___”
oSet HSI/ND to 10 NM range in MAP mode if conducting RNAV SID.
oVerify correct runway is displayed for takeoff. If re-selection of runway is
necessary, SID and transition must then be re-selected if conducting RNAV
SID.
oVerify accuracy of aircraft symbol position relative to runway is acceptable.
Accuracy is acceptable when approaching number one position prior to takeoff,
the apex of the airplane symbol (triangle) appears it will fall between the two lines
that depict the runway symbol
oIf FMC accuracy cannot be verified, select Terrain System Override (TERR
OVRD) until FMC position is updated and do not conduct an RNAV SID.
 T. O. PA.......................COMPLETED
oThe Captain will make the takeoff PA no less than two minutes prior to takeoff,
"Flight Attendants prepare for takeoff"
oWhen takeoff is imminent, chime the cabin by rapidly cycling the NO SMOKING
Switch once.
 Wing Illumination, Runway Turnoff Light and Taxi Light when taking position on the runway
for takeoff
 Just prior to initiating takeoff roll LIGHTS ...ON – All other lights on. Landing lights and
white anti-collision lights may be left off if reduced visibility causes scatterback.

#6 - NON-STANDARD BEFORE TAXI/TAXI CHECKLIST - 16 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“Set T/O flaps late.”
“Debriefed F/O on missing EICAS ‘recall’ on taxi checklist.”
“FO announced ‘Before Taxi Checklist Completed’ before aircraft
movement in ramp area.” “Due to Captain not calling for Before Taxi
Checklist, F.O. moved the flaps while aircraft was in motion in ramp.”
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“Crew conducted flight control check while in ramp area.”
 FLAPS...SET for TAKEOFF: After pushback, select flaps for T/O prior to releasing
parking brake for taxi. Flaps need not be indicating the T/O position for taxi. Do not
delay taxi for transitioning flaps.
 Accomplish Before Taxi items from memory by using a flow pattern prior to brake release
for taxi.
 No “Before Taxi Checklist Complete” call is required.
 FLIGHT CONTROLS...CHECKED - Check flight controls when clear of ramp area.
 EICAS…RECALL - Press RECALL Switch on the CAUTION CANCEL / RECALL Panel.
Check that no system failures are displayed. Press CANCEL Switch (if required).
 Verify accomplishment of Before Taxi and Taxi items by reference to the Taxi checklist
when clear of the ramp area. Saying “Taxi Checklist Complete” confirms the completion
of both checklists.

#7 - NON-STANDARD PARKING CHECKLIST - 16 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“Arrival P.A. too early”
“F/O did arrival PA prior to aircraft coming to a complete stop at the
gate.”
“IRS’s turned off by Captain immediately upon gate arrival, before the
checklist calls for them to be shut down and before the groundspeed
and drift rate could be checked.”
“757 HYD pump (R to L) parking checklist.”
“HYD panel ‘off’, ‘set; is proper response.”
“FOs parking scan and items out of order.”
“No ‘Checklist Complete’ called.”
 Arrival PA made by the FO immediately after gate arrival – aircraft stopped at the gate.
CAPTAINS: PLEASE WAIT TO TURN OFF THE SEATBELT SIGN UNTIL YOUR FO
HAS COMPLETED THIS PA!!
 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM...SET: Depressurize right system last to prevent fluid transfer
between systems.
 IRUs...CHECKED / OFF: Accomplish an End of Flight Accuracy Check after flights
exceeding 60 minutes block to block time.
oCaptain will check residual ground speed. If any residual ground speed exceeds 15
knots: Make an E6 entry.
oFirst Officer will check radial position error tolerance thirty seconds after last
engine is shut down.
 If the error rate for any IRU is:
• Greater than 3.0 nm / hr for flights with block-to-block time less
than eight hours
• Greater than 2.0 nm / hr for flights with block-to-block time eight
hours or more or flights To/From Hawaii
oIf an E6 entry is required because of excessive radial position or ground speed error
for any unit, E6 entry should include block-to-block flight time, radial position
error, and ground speed error for all three systems. Use FMR CODE 3444. Do
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not turn the IRU Switches OFF. The IRUs should be left on for Maintenance.
 When all items have been accomplished, the First Officer will advise the Captain –
“Parking checklist complete.”

#8 - NON-STANDARD TAKEOFF BRIEFING: TAXI ROUTE, HOT SPOTS, SID, FM
II SPECIAL PROCEDURES, ENGINE OUT, TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS
(MEA,MSA,GRID MORA), TRANSITION ALTITUDE - 15 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“Captain did not brief ‘hot spots’ along planned taxi routing.”
“Did not do.”
“Captain displayed complacency with respect to CRM and D & R briefings were minimal, less than what we would consider normal for a
crew that is paired together regularly. LAS eng. out was touched on
but not briefed, taxi out and taxi in routes not briefed. Captain was
completely debriefed with respect to these requirements.”
“No taxi route brief.”
“I did not hear the crew discuss the E/O NOTAM procedure for the
departure RWY.”
“Capt. Pre. Dept. brief could have included more about obstacle & wx.
avoidance.”
“Capt. did not brief expected taxi out route, FO had to go heads down
to check (pull out of book) the DFW standard taxi routes.”
 The takeoff briefing will be conducted by the Captain (or at the Captainʼs discretion, the
Pilot-Flying) at the gate and include, as a minimum:
oDesignate the pilot-flying
oRejected takeoff considerations
oAnd if appropriate:
 Departure procedure (required only if not covered previously by checklist
completion or if revised by ATC) including Transition Altitude
 Airport specific engine failure profile – 10-9 page, NOTAM
 Takeoff alternate
 Takeoff weather conditions
 Runway surface conditions
 Terrain considerations (MEA, MSA, Grid MORA)
 Any other variables associated with the taxi (Route, Standard Taxi
Routes & Hot Spots) and takeoff

#9 - NON-STANDARD CRUISE CHECKLIST - 14 OCCURRENCES
Examples from MLC comments:
“No ‘Checklist Complete’ called.”
“Captain was PM and did not have checklist out. While most of the
items on the cruise and descent checklist were accomplished, some
were not. I strongly emphasized the use of checklists. Some Captains
out there think they are just for F/Os.”
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“Capt. was PM and did not use checklist during these checks, nor did
he call them ‘complete’. Emphasized strongly in debrief.”
“Did not complete cruise checklist in timely manner - slow to log RVSM
- debriefed.”
“Transponder alt reporting not correct OM.”


AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE...CHECKED: After transitioning to cruise flight, verify
(check) aircraft is performing as expected (e.g., airspeed, thrust, etc.).
 ALTIMETERS (RVSM Airspace only)...CHECK / RECORD
oWhen level in RVSM airspace, record the Captain, FO, and Standby Altimeter
readings.
oIn RVSM airspace, transponder altitude reporting source should be selected to
the altimeter closest to the assigned altitude. This will ensure that ATC
receives the same information that the aircraft is using for an altitude source.
 The PM will use the checklist to verify that all items have been accomplished. Any
item that cannot be verified as having been accomplished will require a challenge and
response.
 When all items have been accomplished, the Pilot-Monitoring will advise – “Cruise
checklist complete.”

#10 - NON-STANDARD FMS ROUTE/LEGS VERIFICATION CHECK - 12
OCCURRENCES:
Examples from MLC comments:
“Did not check glass against paper SID during legs check.”
“Read waypoints from CDU not from HSI.”
“Did not do.”
“Captain did not perform FMC route/leg verification properly.
Debriefed. Although FO knew the correct procedure, he did not feel the
need to speak up (more) forcibly.”
“The crew read the fixes from the paper FP to the FMC while the other
pilot checked them in proper sequence and stepped through them. No
route check ever done.”
“Legs check was accomplished page at a time rather than stepping
through fix at a time."
 CDU...SET and CHECKED: Check the Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) route vs. the Flight
Plan.
Route Verification Check: After ACARS route up-link, or manual route loading,
waypoint names will be displayed and verified by both pilots. One pilot will read
waypoint names from the Navigation Display (HSI/ND) while the other pilot
checks them against the flight plan or current ATC clearance.
Legs Verification Check: plan and / or ATC clearance is entered and that all points
are connected by a solid magenta line. A crosscheck of each flight plan leg, as
displayed on the HSI, must be made against each leg of the computer flight plan so
any deviation or unusual heading change is readily apparent. One pilot will read the
HSI display, while the other pilot checks it against the SID, flight plan or ATC
clearance. This also ensures that no leg or waypoint has been omitted.
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HSI Mode
Selector................................................................................PLAN
 HSI Range Selector..................................................................AS
DESIRED
 LEGS Key..........................................................................................
PRESS
 Using the MAP CTR STEP prompt [ 5R ], step through and read
each waypoint from the center of the HSI screen to the other pilot
who verifies the waypoint from the left hand margin of the flight
plan.
oNOTE: When conducting an RNAV SID, the check must be made using the
Jeppesen paper copy of the SID, including any SID transitions.
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